

## Auto-prognosis

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It turns out that to be asked to speak of oneself is more of a burden than an opportunity. If thinking is immersed in one's life and situation it can no more be objectified than one's loves or disgusts. The tone is impossible to stipulate. It wavers. It can't help but be retrospective like Minerva's owl, but it may attempt to speak primarily not to what has been done but what remains undone. Its speaking, fessing up, then becomes an aspiration rooted in having-lived-with, a speaking-with, a con-fession. In this, one may hope not to be alone. Thought in any case belongs to nobody. One seeks only to belong to thought. But in that seeking I am returned to myself and then the voices that resound within me. Even again, returned to the place of those voices in the bodies I saw and heard, and the world that shouted, soothed and pounded my own body in its lived time. Always communication: body, others, world. Suffering and expressing, active and passive emotions, Spinoza calls them. Not inside-outside, the shadow of Descartes, but living-dying, active-passive, speaking-listening, in the medium, in the middle, in between. When I teach, I read texts not retrospectively but by trying to make come alive the question which the thinker was trying to put clearly. In the moment of the thinking. The retrospective reading is no longer alive; it suffers the death of philosophy. The phenomenological reading lives philosophy's natality—which it has taken until nearly our own time for Hannah Arendt to name. Natality enters the world and does not yet leave it. Its identity comes from others. It lives with voices.

### 1. Con-fession

My engagement with issues of language was not primordial, so to speak, in that my initial work on technology and reason, stimulated by the crisis and expectation of the 1960's, was grounded in the primacy of experience.<sup>1</sup> The teleology of this work aimed to suggest "a role for reason beyond offering technical fixes in the efforts to solve the world's plethora of environmental crisis."<sup>2</sup> Already in the 1970's, at least at the Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought at York University, whenever one said 'experience,' both Hegelians and hermeneuticists jumped up and said that 'experience is always mediated by a past; it is never immediate as such' and that 'the imbeddedness of thought in language places it in history.' If the immediacy of experience is always mediated, then the starting-place of thought cannot be from the here-and-now but takes place through an engagement with what is inherited in which the here-and-now is from the start constructed and relativized. It has never seemed to me that this undeniable placing of the thinker, and thus thought, within a historical situation justifies abandoning the unsurpassable first-person character of thinking—which is what 'experience' means, above all, in phenomenology.<sup>3</sup> Such a placing is rather the product of thought. It is no easy matter to say where one's precedents lie, what has made the place from where one must inevitably start. It is this that I meant to express in saying much later that "one is forced to risk a decisive act that institutes, brings into being, a philosophy. A tradition is founded on this act, not the reverse, and in this sense philosophy belongs in the wilderness."<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Post-fession

I would say now that the rejection of immediacy for the primordially of language defines the contemporary philosophic situation. This point is made these days more often with reference to the post-structuralist emphasis on the constitution of the subject by language than the Hegelian-hermeneutic synthesis that predominated in the 1970's. It is not that I reject this point outright but that I see it as more of a situation from which, and about which, problems may be posed than a solution (to other problems which, in any case, are now left behind). One may well wonder whether there are ever 'solutions' as such in philosophy—and without the 'as such' there is no philosophy at all. The linguistic turn in philosophy and the human sciences is thus not a 'reality' *per se* but a metaphor whereby features of language come to stand for and illuminate human experience *tout court*. Furthermore, the centrality of this metaphor says something about the specificity of our time and its limits indicate the character of a fully contemporary critical theory. Thus, "the disembodiment of signs is characteristic of modernity. It is based upon the standing back from the world and doubling of it in thought that occurs in representation."<sup>5</sup> This situation constructs a barrier due to which the inevitable first-person character of thought is only obliquely recognized these days in such embarrassing locutions as 'strategic essentialism,' the 'choice' to deconstruct one object rather than another, or the common co-existence of a liberal political ontology with a theoretical post-structuralism. My work has thus operated at the seam between phenomenology and post-structuralism, or perhaps in the opposition between them, in order to ask questions rooted in the specificity of our time in the first person of my/our own voice.

## 3. Profession

It is from the tension between the inevitable experiential immediacy to the thinker and the *ex post facto* understanding of the construction of this immediacy by language and history that what I have come to call 'comparative media theory' emerged.<sup>6</sup> Calling this a "tension" disallows both the Hegelian-hermeneutic synthesis and the post-structuralist rejection of immediacy which would undermine the first-person character of thought and the risks that this entails and embraces. It marks a space in which the problem of expression comes into view. Thus, when it is said that "it is really about finding a place for philosophy and finding a philosophy for (our) place" and that "it suffers from waves of its own iterations, each one aimed at a re-diagnosis of the same crisis," I can only agree.<sup>7</sup> To suffer the iterations of finding where one stands is philosophy itself. This is not a discipline, nor an esotericism, but the struggle to express the meaning of the movements and conflicts of our time. Not necessary to understanding the details, perhaps, nor to plan the reactions of institutions,<sup>8</sup> but to confront them as critical forces that explode our categories and pose a challenge for thought, to express the newness in the new—and also, perhaps, to revere the oldness in the old that is our heritage in allowing us to express the new.

## 4. Expression

Comparative media theory begins by taking seriously Harold Innis's question "why do we attend to the things to which we attend?"<sup>9</sup> and interpreting it, not primarily in a psychological sense, but in a perceptual, institutional and intellectual sense.<sup>10</sup> While communication can refer to representations of prior events in the world—which is its usual meaning in communication studies—it is more importantly directed toward the means whereby we perceive the world to be as it is and therefore to allow certain actions and thoughts and to discourage others. In this sense communication gives an experiential shape to a specific lifeworld. Read in this way, Innis is consistent with phenomenology—even if it be a "faithfully unfaithful reading"<sup>11</sup>—while his original contribution is the notion that a medium of communication is the key to understanding the lifeworld.

The medium of communication such as papyrus, paper, television sets and broadcast apparatus, etc. is only an external vehicle for a content-oriented, representational approach to communication. For Innis, however, the medium of communication both contained a 'bias' toward certain a form of expression and also transformed the material basis of society. Generally, Innis has been understood as referring simply to the 'dead materiality' of physical things. It is the major innovation of my interpretation of Innis to connect the medium of communication to the embodied motility of the human body as described in phenomenology. The 'living body' is understood in phenomenology to be an orientation in time and space prior to abstract categories and numeration that is the origin of all thinking. The body's encounters with the world combine an aesthetic synthesis of the perception of things with a kinaesthetic spontaneity based in the body's 'I can.'

"Therefore the spatiality of material thinghood and of the thing-world constitutes itself primordially in kinaesthetic self-movement, in the traversing of space in self-nearing and self-distancing."<sup>12</sup> This kinaesthetic motility is not opposed to the world in the form of a subject-object relation but incorporates the world, and is incorporated into the world, through the bodily engagement with things. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, described how the blind man's cane is not an external material thing but the very means of his perception of the world and thus an extension of his body. "To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. Habit expresses our power of dilating our being in the world, or changing our existence by incorporating fresh instruments."<sup>13</sup> The human world is thus understood as a living body extended throughout a plurality of media of communication in comparative media theory. As Norman Madarasz perceptively noted it, "is committed to a conceptualization of culture as a type of discourse aesthetics. It can be said to exceed any indexization of theory to art. ... Aesthetics should be taken in the wider Greek sense as a logic of sensibility ... ." <sup>14</sup> Comparative media theory thus begins from the kinaesthetic motility described in phenomenology (and used to interpret Innis) and Innis' notion of bias, or inclination, in a medium of communication that gives a certain form, or style, to a specific experiential synthesis in order to give a historical, pre-constituted turn to the kinaesthetic synthesis. It thus attempts to give proper due to both immediacy and mediation but in a form of tension or opposition rather than Hegelian-hermeneutic synthesis (of immediacy and mediation) or post-structuralist rejection (of immediacy). To the extent that such a pre-constituted but *original* subject—whose originality is constituted in the act of reflection—can found a different form of relation to others "such community is not based on a shared essence, but on an asymmetrical encounter *against history*."<sup>15</sup> Kinaesthetic motility within a human world structured by a dominant bias becomes the basic problematic of communication. The question of 'reality' thus becomes a question of *translation* between different media of communication not of reference to something extra-communicative. The role of new social movements in these translations concretizes the philosophical concern with 'the newness of the new' in political engagements. To this extent, and with another difficult history under its belt, comparative media theory takes up the emancipatory claims of Marxism in a plural, open-ended fashion.

## 5. Pressing

Notice two inclinations of a slippery word: press, as in compress, force, crowd, and press, as in press into the navy, urge, or demand (OED). The human world forces and crowds us, pushes us together, moves us in waves, like sticks in the river of time. It demands that we enter, sign up, urges us to move with the wave—or the press gang, depending on how lucky we are. Then, a third meaning: the root of confess, profess, express, which does not negate the first two but turns it toward a voluntary act, if there be a voluntary act, whereby one fesses up to the thought that one harbours against the wave. Again, press, from the old French *prester*, like the current Spanish

*prestamo*, loan, advance pay (OED). I lend my thought to the wave, pay out, press upon its direction. Then, press, publication, articulation, a wave within the wave, a greater wave. Not a message, but a bottle. The chosen word, or phrase, is diction, enunciation, dictated, even dictatorial, authoritarian, authoritative, made by an author (OED). A message, not a bottle.

This message-bottle gestalt shift pervades not only communication but theories of communication. I have argued that orality plays two distinct functions in Innis' thinking: as a single medium of communication that can be compared (on the same level, as it were) to others and as the basic, foundational human power of communication as such, the meaning-fundament which underlies all media of communication.<sup>16</sup> My intuition is that this vacillation is ubiquitous in studies of media but I haven't tried to follow this up. McLuhan is the best known of those for whom the gestalt switch is the model for the study of communication. However, whenever one gets beyond media content, or information, to the notion of 'medium' and 'media' as such one has to think through this duality in some way. A medium is designed in a prior situation and oriented toward some communicative goal: script, book, radio, television, Internet, etc. However, after some time the new medium is no longer new. It enters into the media environment and is no longer an add-on. Its function is thus in the manner that it horizontally 'translates' other media rather than in the goal that defined its design. This temporal sequence is also co-present whenever we investigate any given medium within the media environment. In fixing on a medium we abstract it from the environment. It thus becomes the figure for the translations between all other media. In choosing another medium this one reverts to the environment. Thus, we escape the dead-ends of an epistemological realism in which events are seen as external to a medium, merely represented within it, and an epistemological constructivism, or coherence theory, in which all there is of the event is its internality to the medium. The escape derives from the fact that there is always more than one medium in a media environment. Thus, the gestalt switch between medium and media environment accounts for the fact that communication is always both representational and constitutive, message and bottle, pressing and diction, the two senses of the word 'institution' (*Urstiftung*) as a beginning instituting and a received institution.<sup>17</sup>

## **6. Pressed into Service: Speaking No One's Tongue**

Due to the difficulty of finding work in Canada during the 1980's, I found myself teaching in the U.S.A. for seven years. Among other things I found out that the idea that they only teach positivist media studies is a caricature. I discovered their version of rhetoric, which allowed me to re-connect with the debate between rhetoric and philosophy that instituted philosophy. My tongue was split between what and how I could speak with Canada as the ground and the mythical figure of groundless speech of 'international' theory. Thus, I have two books on communication: a Canadian one and an everywhere-nowhere one, though the latter allowed me to come to grips with U.S. studies of the rhetoric of social movements. For, after all, the USA is really nowhere. But is not the relation between rhetoric and philosophy as such but rather the ground of the distinction between philosophy and rhetoric that is at issue—even though it is investigated in that text almost entirely from the side of an expanded concept of rhetoric. Comparative media theory is understood to be a rhetoric of media forms that institutes kinaesthetically-defined worlds. The last word of the book indicates that philosophy plays a much larger role than this emphasis on rhetoric would suggest. "Such open-ness, as open-ness, is the limit of communication. We may find it in those components of social life that resist closure and which open humanity to its possibility of reflexive self-constitution, but this possibility itself emerges at the border of human culture, the region where the sacred begins. Since it alone enters this region without belief or armour, philosophy hovers on the skin of mankind."<sup>18</sup> Philosophy is at one with experiences of the sacred in which the totality of

human life is shaken but distinct from them insofar as it would not harden such experiences into a religion—which I would understand as any acceptance of a definitive, superhuman origin for the vocabulary of the sacred. Philosophy is constituted by its battle with rhetoric in the domain of human affairs and its battle with religion over the sacred.

Philosophy must therefore think the whole of human life. How should one understand this ‘whole,’ or totality? An empirical aggregate will obviously not do, since any human obviously cannot know all the things or events that are important in human life. Ancient philosophy understood totality as a cosmos—a structured, value-laden, interdependent whole that defines the role and limits of human life. Modern philosophy, in unleashing human power for self-transformation against any priorly defined state, conceived totality as the ‘unconditioned totality of conditions.’

*(Dis)figurations* suggests that the concept of horizon in phenomenology is a new basis for thinking totality as the style of a form of life.<sup>19</sup> The thinking of the horizon of a world thus encounters the sacred, the beyond-human origin of the human. Philosophy must think the plurality of forms of life, not in their empirical plurality, but each one in its particularity, in order to do battle with rhetoric and guard the sacred origin of ethics within the particularity of the human world in which the philosopher is situated.

## 7. Auto-critique

The living body is a kinaesthetic self-movement which constitutes the world. My contribution was to show that kinaesthetic syntheses, in both passive and active constitution, are rooted in the media of communication that enable perception of the world, that a specific kinaesthetic synthesis is constituted by a complex of media of communication. Additionally, to show how a kinaesthetic synthesis is ‘set into play’ by the ‘institution,’ or ‘*Urstiftung*,’ of a complex of media. ‘Institution’ is a species of ‘constitution’ in which a temporal structure is embedded. Husserl uses the term to describe the ‘mathematical substraction of nature’ by Galilean science such that one can not ‘go back’ before it. An institution sets into play a distinction between before and after, constitutes a new beginning, that remains an essential reference and foundation until it comes to exhaust its possibilities in an *Endstiftung*. Thus, a media complex institutes a kinaesthetic synthesis which defines a ‘world.’ My argument is that consumer society is such a kinaesthetic synthesis and that social movements are, indeed, bodily *self-movements* that augur the *Endstiftung* of consumer society and, thus, open the possibility of a new beginning.<sup>20</sup> The sense in which this is an ‘end’ does not imply any sense of moral superiority. Indeed, I would want to say that in some cases much can be learned from supposedly surpassed forms of communication and even that some of them should be revived. The romance of communication studies with technological ‘advances’ makes this a difficult sell, but I doubt whether such nay-sayers would really want to hold onto the ideal of progress after the disastrous 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>21</sup>

It is an interesting question whether comparative media theory might be able to supercede traditional social inquiries that tend to take institutions for granted rather than inquiring into the biases of communication that constitute them. Can the family, for example, be understood within comparative media theory? I think that it can, but more work is needed here. Levi-Strauss, Goody, Watt and others have argued that the differentiation of the so-called ‘primitive’ societies studied by anthropology from our own depends upon the invention of writing.<sup>22</sup> I accept this but want and need to say further that orality and family, ie. tribal societies, are still more fundamentally linked.

In saying this, I want to begin to address a deficiency. Even though I refer to Marx’s and Nietzsche’s arguments that consciousness is produced, not given, the theory thus far has not made more than a passing nod to the notion of an ‘unconscious’ within a medium.<sup>23</sup> The approach sketched would suggest that one analyze the unconscious produced within a medium as a

consequence of the lack of available translation within the media environment. Difficult translations, translations 'resisted' by the configuration of media such that they produce a silence within a given medium, serve to define the specificity of the cultural configuration through what it defines as unspeakable.<sup>24</sup> This is the other side of the emphasis of a medium of a kinaesthetic and sensual 'bias.' The dominant bias serves to define some translations as impossible and irrational—such as translating speech into the tactile sense in literate societies, for example.

Returning to the relation of orality and family, the solution lies, I would propose, in thinking of the mouth's role in orality as linked to the vagina's role in giving birth. This is based upon the common sense view that regards woman as the sole actor in conception and reproduction. In this way, the role of speech in social reproduction could be analyzed. One can understand the speaking that gives rise to the rhetoric of men as a displacement and substitution for the birth-giving of women, perhaps based on envy—that is to say, the necessity to insinuate oneself into social reproduction. Thus, one could show that the account of rhetoric in Aristotle is complementary to his claim that only the male is an active force in procreation, that woman is a merely passive receptacle for male seed.<sup>25</sup> The inclusion of the mother's brother in a direct relation to the child—which is a precondition for tribal society—is as a supplement to the vagina, the vagina as an instrument of birth not of sex, through the male organ that *must* not enter it (due to the incest taboo). The mother without a brother, even if he be fictive, is impossible, because one must not only be born as a human being, but as a specific human being, into a given tribe and place.

This analysis implies that Greek rhetoric and public address is not the 'original' oral society, as many communication theorists and philosophers propose, but rather tribal societies—in which the political role of orality remains linked to the fecundity of the vagina and the supplement of the brother. The orality of rhetoric is already a displacement of the orality that spits us into the world. This analysis would explain the Greeks' denigration of maternity and the consequent appropriation of creativity by males in the public sphere and account for the origin of rhetoric in the public-private separation as a negation—in Freud's sense, as a negation which negates an affirmation, or recognition—of the vagina.<sup>26</sup> Surely any form of spiritualism—ie. un-embodied spirit which is the twin of the determinism of 'dead materiality' (that Marx saw in Feuerbach)—must denigrate woman's power to give birth/life, because that is the phenomenological 'proof' that spirit and matter are intertwined in kinaestheses that give us the world.

The obverse observation would be that in societies like our own, which one could define through an electronic media-complex, the family is a shrunken institution, as is rhetoric, and we are dominated by sight. It is from the assumption of the sovereignty of sight, which has been the dominant metaphor for knowledge in philosophy, that the vagina appears as an always-already-having-been-castrated. There would be two senses of castration, now: through a primary displacement of the vagina that formed the Greek public from tribal society and, later, through a secondary displacement of the phallus that instituted the generalized privacy of consumer society. The battle between philosophy and rhetoric takes place after the first displacement and it remains a question whether Socrates' midwifery can understand fully enough the primary one. My argument that philosophy, insofar as it aims at starting anew against tradition, contains an 'elective affinity' with the new social movements thus needs to investigate the kinaesthetic ground of philosophy itself.

## **8. Addiction**

If diction is one's saying, the way one is pressed into service, and also the way one presses into, and against, the world, then because 'ad' is "to express motion or direction towards" and an addict "to devote or apply habitually" (OED), comparative media theory requires an engagement

with one's habitat. How does one say, express precisely and 'as such' one's habitat and one's habituation? I began with Canada, my immigrant's embrace of, and addiction to, Canada, but came to realize through the politics of Québec and the First Nations that my Canada is English Canada, "the only identity of the Canadian nations-state from which I can write as a participant, one whose destiny is also my own."<sup>27</sup> Many argue with this denomination, but since I have rejected the transmission model of communication for a model of expression, the dominant public language must be seen as having its effect.

Communication is deeply rooted in the history of Canada as the colony of French, British and American empires. A colony provides raw materials to the centre and receives manufactured goods in return. It is thus stretched between an encounter with the ahistorical, archaic and a historical link to civilization. Geography, the land, versus history. The two poles are held together by communication: transportation of goods and people, information and identity. This imperial communication is repeated within Canada: the interventionist national state, its development of infrastructure, promotion of national identity. Thus, a divided identity: European and later Canadian, historical and continuous. But also: regional and local, tied to the land, innovative and discontinuous. A hegemonic struggle: a historical continuity which presents itself as an umbrella under which all particular identities can be subsumed, the condition for their very existence, versus particular loyalties whose local relations must be severed by such a subsumption. This division is apparent at all levels: international (Canada versus the U.S.A.), national (Ottawa versus Québec and First Nations; Ottawa versus the regions), sub-national (southern Ontario over the north, metropolitan capital over the regional hinterlands), etc. I defined English Canada as a border in the wilderness, the silent between-point where the babble of unhinged mad discourses passes into the stable sanity of the imperial monologue.<sup>28</sup> This is the origin of philosophy in our own place

It has often been thought that one must choose between a supposedly old-fashioned nationalism that opposes a uniform Canadian identity to Yankee imperialism and a post-modern plurality of identities within Canada. But why? Such a false choice is the index of a political failure. Instead, the issue is the "recognition of the *multiple forms of dependency* that exist in contemporary society" such that "each [must] be analysed in terms of the *specific linkage* that ties it to the system as a whole."<sup>29</sup> There are many contexts, each containing specific relations of dependency. They translate each other, producing complex and overlapping forms, but this plurality does not evacuate the problem of dependency, nor that of emancipation. It does mean that one must abandon the notion of 'society' as a vague notion of an absolute context that could decide the relations between multiple dependencies for a single 'primary contradiction,' and requires that one accept the multiplicity of social movements as an unsurpassable fact.

## 9. Prediction/Aspiration/Inspiration

Philosophy cannot predict the future and is, in a certain sense, limited to the domain of the already seen and heard. But, to the extent that it trains itself to apprehend the 'newness in the new,' it can become the voice of that which is straining to appear, to achieve solidity. Prediction is thus less like the 'aforesaid' (OED) and more like an aspiration, that to which one aspires, the diction, saying, of that which inspires, which one breathes in and gives life. The multiplicity of dependencies gives voice to the multiplicity of emancipations. Overcoming phallogentrism, Eurocentrism, anglocentrism, etc. implies an aspiration to overcoming 'centrisms' of all kinds, of a thought without centrism, of a living without centrism. "A centrism consists in the subsumption of diverse experiences and contents under an explanatory scheme that is *presupposed as universal although it incorporates elements that arose in a particular history*. A return to concrete and diverse experiences does not negate universality, but opens the possibility that a genuine universality

might emerge through the displacement of centrisms.”<sup>30</sup> It is the problem of all dependencies to discover how not to be regarded as merely the content of an already given form, but to originate a form of explanation or thought itself. Not to kick the habit, but to form one. Such a universality cannot be found in tradition in Hegelian-hermeneutic fashion (since that relies on a Eurocentric history) nor simply ruled out as impossible (due to the post-structuralist rejection of immediacy for the ‘constitutive outside’) but must somehow emerge from the return to particularity in a certain mode. Particularity is not particularism or tribalism. “The central proposal of *A Border Within* is that the inhabitation of particularity is the necessary entry point into a non-exclusionary form of universality” one good reader has said.<sup>31</sup> How can this happen? Its first condition is that the universality does not subsume each particularity. Thus, that the universality is only available *through* the particularity on which it remains dependent—a universality proposed but in question, a particularity that lends its content to the universality but does not reduce the universality to a particularism, what I have come to call a ‘constitutive paradox.’ “To give a formal definition: lacking hegemonic fixture, an identity oscillates paradoxically between being simply a particular identity and being a candidate for content of the universal hegemonic identity.”<sup>32</sup> The aspiration of an overcoming of all centrisms would culminate in such an identity.

## 10. Spiration

One aspires to a future which inspires one in the present: inspire as to infuse into the mind, to breath in (OED). This inspiration is life, the daily continuation of birth. Thus infused, one exhales, breathes out, dictates. If one dictates too much without inspiration, one expires. Death is this expiration. The meditation on death produced philosophy. Movement in and out, body in the world, no subject and object. Still between in and out, active and passive, speaking and listening. After inspiration, before dictation. After dictation, before inspiration. What should we call it: the open mouth, the still air, no movement to define an in and out. Not ‘in,’ not ‘ex,’ without a prefix, perhaps just spiration, a silence between death and life. Border. “When spiration splits itself into expiration and inspiration by instituting a border, the two sides of *display* and *abjection* arise. This asymmetry indicates an ‘involuntary’ moment in one’s location.”<sup>33</sup> Philosophy must accept its location and, through a decisive act, turns fate (particularity) into a destiny (universality) that can address the human condition. We are all spirants (the Latin present participle of breath), breathers. Philosophy now wants to name the stillness between breaths, that stillness from which we all become present here for a while. In this spiration, philosophy is between natality and death, star-struck at their border.

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> Ian Angus, *Technique and Enlightenment: Limits of Instrumental Reason* (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1984).
- <sup>2</sup> Kevin Michael DeLuca, "Rethinking Critical Theory: Instrumental Reason, Judgment, and the Environmental Crisis," *Environmental Ethics*, Vol. 23, p. 325
- <sup>3</sup> I learned this before SPT from José Huertas-Jourda at the University of Waterloo.
- <sup>4</sup> Ian Angus, *A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality and Wilderness* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1997) p. 105.
- <sup>5</sup> Ian Angus, *(Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics* (London and New York: Verso, 2000) p. 256.
- <sup>6</sup> Comparative media theory is the name for my approach to communication. It is explained in Ian Angus, *Primal Scenes of Communication: Communication, Consumerism, Social Movements* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000) pp. 35-8. I came up with this name on the spot when Shakuntala Rao demanded one to replace "Innis, McLuhan and all that" in about 1989. I've never been satisfied with it but can't come up with a better one.
- <sup>7</sup> Peter C. van Wyck, "Telling Stories," *The Semiotic Review of Books*, 14.2, 2004, pp. 6, 5.
- <sup>8</sup> Bruce Morito notes in a review of *A Border Within* that I cannot account for "large-scale organizational needs" nor a "more formalized, universal conception of identity" in *Symposium: Journal of the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought*, II.2, Fall 1998, p. 240. Indeed. Such an attempt would be deeply troubling for a critical theory of society. Vincent Di Norcia on the other hand found the connection of Innis to Critical Theory useful. See his review in *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2001.
- <sup>8</sup> *Primal Scenes of Communication*, p. 36.
- <sup>9</sup> Harold Innis, *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1973) p. xvii.
- <sup>10</sup> See my recent short statement of the theory in "Media, Expression and a New Politics: Eight Theses" *Media and Cultural Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005.
- <sup>11</sup> Peter C. van Wyck, op. cit., p. 4.
- <sup>12</sup> Ludwig Landgrebe, "The Phenomenology of Corporeality" in *The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl*, trans. Donn Welton (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981) p. 39.
- <sup>13</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) p. 143.
- <sup>14</sup> Norman Madarasz, "Delivering Our Attention: Ian Angus' *Primal Scenes of Communication: Communication, Consumerism, Social Movements*," *Symposium: Journal of the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought*, V.2, Autumn 2001, p. 258.
- <sup>15</sup> *(Dis)figurations*, p. 208.
- <sup>16</sup> *Primal Scenes of Communication*, pp. 29-31; *A Border Within*, pp. 67-8.
- <sup>17</sup> *Primal Scenes of Communication*, pp.4-5, 189-91; *(Dis)figurations*, pp. 29-31, 99-100, 115-26; *A Border Within*, pp. 70-1.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 191.
- <sup>19</sup> *(Dis)figurations*, especially chapter 3.
- <sup>20</sup> Thus, part three of *Primal Scenes of Communication* should have discussed 'new institutions' not 'new mediations.' This was a slip back into Hegelian language even while it was surpassed (sic).
- <sup>21</sup> Vincent Di Norcia found this anti-historical element of *Primal Scenes of Communication* its most incredible component, even going so far as to obscure that this does not imply a wholesale return

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to a previous social order. See his review in *Canadian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2001.

<sup>22</sup> *Primal Scenes of Communication*, p. 36.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> The introduction of a Freudian/Nietzschean 'unconscious' into comparative media theory does not, in my view, necessitate an abandonment of its phenomenological starting-point. Within phenomenology, the issue can be theoretically pharsed, in a manner that avoids some of the problems of the Freudian and Nietzschean languages, as an issue of 'sedimentation' and passive synthesis, and the possibility of a reflexive 're-activation' of this material.

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, 732a25-735a4.

<sup>26</sup> Sigmund Freud, "On Negation" in *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. XIX*. Trans. James Strachey. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961).

<sup>27</sup> Ian Angus, "The Paradox of Cultural Identity in English Canada," *Topia: A Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies*, No. 10, Fall 2003, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup> *A Border Within*, pp. 126-34.

<sup>29</sup> *A Border Within*, p. 45.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>31</sup> Jennifer Henderson, "Cultural Studies in Canadian Studies," *Topia: A Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies*, No. 4, Fall 2000, p. 96.

<sup>32</sup> "The Paradox of Cultural Identity in English Canada," p. 29. See also Ian Angus, "La démocratie décentrée: un modèle multiculturel et postcolonial de la critique," trans. Pierre R. Desrosiers and Mark Fortier in Jules Duchastel (ed.) *Fédéralismes et Mondialisation: L'avenir de la démocratie et de la citoyenneté* (Outremont: Athéna éditions, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> *(Dis)figurations*, p. 180.