

Jacob Klein's Revision of Husserl's *Crisis*:
A Contribution to the Transcendental History of Reification

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The stated intention of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, especially as it gained increasing clarity in his late work, was to cure the "crisis of the European sciences" which was, or is, also the "crisis of European humanity." This intention must be limited by the historical and critical analyses that attempt to substantiate it to the same degree that these analyses themselves must be renewed and extended to measure up to the intention. Only such a mutual interrogation can decide whether the healing intention of phenomenology should be revised, extended or abandoned. The revision by Jacob Klein of the role of mathematics in the institution (*Urstiftung*) of modern science as described by Husserl is one major site for such mutual interrogation. Klein's revision is based on his account of "symbol-generating abstraction"¹ that he traces to the reformulation of modern mathematics by Vieta and others. My concern in this paper is to follow out the implications of Klein's revision of Husserl for the problem of reification in social reality and the human sciences.

Husserl's critique of modernity in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* centres on the "mathematization of nature" whereby nature is interpreted as in reality mathematical and thus amenable to a form of knowledge that is fundamentally mathematical. On this basis, modern knowledge accomplishes a "mathematical substruction of the world" in which the world as a totality is understood as being fundamentally mathematical and all qualitative

features are understood to be secondary effects rooted in human subjectivity. In order to understand the constitution of modernity it is necessary to understand the original formation and perdurance of the structures that pre-form subsequent experiences. Here phenomenology encounters the question of history, not simply as empirical history, but as transcendental history. It is in the context of clarifying the sense in which Galileo established the new science that Husserl introduced the term *Urstiftung*—which can be translated as ‘primal establishment,’ but better as ‘institution.’² It is mainly a temporal structure in the sense in which it is different to be born after the introduction of compulsory public schooling than before it, but it contains a spatial dimension in the sense that such an introduction begins in some places before others whose ‘uneven development’ then exerts an interactive ‘push and pull’ between them.³

Transcendental history is concerned with the temporal inscription of the life-world such that subsequent empirical history takes a different form after than before its institution. The process of institution may be drawn out in empirical history but from the viewpoint of transcendental history it constitutes one historical event. During this event of institution, its full implications and consequences are not yet evident. Similarly, certain elements enter into the institution whose origin is simply passed over and whose validity is simply taken for granted due to its prior sedimentation in tradition. Thus, more is given in the instituting

event than is visible at the time. An event in transcendental history will thus often take considerable empirical history for its institution to become a question worth investigation, let alone be completely clarified. Such was the case for the mathematization of nature by Galileo that Husserl began to investigate within transcendental history due to the problem that the contemporary crisis of the sciences posed for the relation of science and philosophy to human life.⁴

Immediately prior to his analysis of the mathematization of nature in *Crisis*, Husserl observed that the reshaping of philosophy at the beginning of the modern age was based upon the “immense change of meaning whereby *universal* tasks were set, primarily for mathematics (as geometry and as formal-abstract theory of numbers and magnitudes).”⁵ Thus, it is not only the interpretation of nature in mathematical terms, nor this combined with the ontologization toward a mathematical world—which arguably was already present in Plato—but that this combination is based upon a different mathematics unavailable to the Greek or Medieval worlds. Husserl associates this difference with the idea of “a universal, systematically coherent a priori, an infinite, and yet ... self-enclosed, coherent systematic theory which, proceeding from axiomatic concepts and propositions, permits the deductively univocal construction of any conceivable shape which can be drawn in space.”⁶ This axiomatic and deductive theory-form has normally been called, since Riemann, a ‘definite manifold.’ Modern knowledge thus consists in the a priori

availability of such manifolds whose applicability to a given content-area is undertaken by the relevant science in each case.

In this context Husserl refers to sedimented judgment-systems, or definite manifolds, as techniques—which he defines in this way: “it becomes a mere art of achieving, through calculating technique according to technical rules, results the genuine sense of whose truth can be attained only by concretely intuitive thinking actually directed at the subject matter itself.”⁷ The definition of technique as an art of manipulation of sign-systems without regard to content thus corresponds to the critical, healing role of phenomenology as accomplishment of genuine application through the restoration of the intuitive foundation of sign-systems. Here Husserl refers to the “superficialization of meaning which unavoidably accompanies the technical development and practice of method,” indicating that the specifically modern universal form of knowledge, the crisis of the sciences, and the critical and healing function of phenomenology are intrinsically bound up together and go back to “the algebraic terms and ways of thinking that have become widespread in the modern period since Vieta.”⁸

This is the only reference that Husserl makes to Vieta in *Crisis*. He normally refers to Descartes as the founder of modern philosophy and, in one the main innovations of the text, to Galileo’s mathematization of nature as the origin of the modern concept of science upon which

Descartes built. Klein's work investigated in much greater historical detail than Husserl the prior transformation of algebra by Vieta. He argued that it was the Arabic number-system that led to an indirect understanding of numbers and "ultimately to the substitution of the ideal numerical entities, as intended in all Greek arithmetic, by their symbolic expression."⁹ Thus, "the technique of operating with symbols replaces the science of numbers."¹⁰ The symbolic technique that defines modern algebra is comprised, according to Klein, of two main characteristics. It identifies the object with the means of its representation and it replaces the real determinateness of an object with the mere possibility of making it determinate.¹¹ This abstraction distinguishes modern algebra from all previous mathematics and explains its purely formal reference to an indeterminate "empty anything-whatever," in Husserl's words.¹² It is through this unprecedented universality that formal, symbol-generating abstraction comes to hold a central place in the new science and thus modern knowledge as such.

Since symbol-generating abstraction identifies the object and its means of representation, it produces self-enclosed sign-systems without any intrinsic reference to an object-domain. When an empirical science establishes the applicability of a given manifold to a specific domain, it establishes this, so to speak, only from the side of the domain. The manifold itself is elaborated and justified with regard only to its internal coherence. The applicability to the domain thus affects neither the

elaboration, coherence, completeness nor extension of the manifold. For this reason, a manifold cannot yield an intuitive fulfilment in any sense similar to the intuitive fulfilment of an *eidōs* as a content-filled, or material abstraction. While the *eidōs* 'chair' is intuitively filled with adequate evidence in any instance of a chair, the symbolic and formal abstraction 'x' cannot be intuitively filled with a corresponding intuition. No concrete object intuitively fills such an abstraction because the abstraction essentially refers only to the possibility of determinateness not its actualization in a given exemplar. Thus, in Klein's words, "the things of the world are no longer understood as countable beings ... rather the *structure* of the world ... [is] understood as a '*lawfully*' ordered course of '*events*'."¹³ The sedimented meaning of formal knowledge, while it necessarily generates an emptying and superficialization of meaning, cannot be desedimented and restored in an immediate intuition. Klein's deeper investigation of the origin of modern knowledge through an elaboration of Husserl's passing reference to Vieta shows that the twofold task of phenomenology as analysis and critique has been bifurcated. Characterization of modern knowledge as a technique originating in symbol-generating abstraction disallows the restoration of immediate intuition to the scientific edifice. Thus, as Burt Hopkins has shown, the consequence is not "the *unintelligibility per se* of the formal meaning intention of the formula, but rather its 'unintelligibility' relative to the

‘foundedness’ of the traditional categorial meaning (*eidos*) in the intuition of individuals in the life-world.”¹⁴

This conclusion concurs with my earlier investigation, made without reference to Klein, that formal logic depends upon an ungrounded assumption of its relation to individuals in a double sense. In a sense pertaining to the reference of the morphology of judgments ‘below’ to the ‘ultimate substrates’ (Husserl) that they categorially form, it is assumed that there subsists a truth-in-itself independent of that formation. More important in the present context is the teleological assumption that “truth requires not merely logical form but a relationship of this form to an appropriate individual content ...The relation to individuals involves the intention of formal logic to bring individuals to determination in knowledge.”¹⁵ If this teleological relation is not a relation to intuitive fulfilment of individuals as Husserl thought, then the applicability of formal judgment-systems to purported individuals must be understood as a specific kind of adumbration.¹⁶

The specific form of adumbration of evidence that lacks intuitive fulfilment can be designated ‘technique’ or ‘technical evidence.’ It is an adumbration of the concrete individuals encountered in the lifeworld which renders such individuals only insofar as they constitute exemplars of the formal sign-system in question. In this respect modern and ancient knowledge proceed differently. Whereas ancient knowledge could trace each concept back to the individual instantiations from which it

was abstracted, from *eidōs* to concrete cases, modern formal abstraction cannot so proceed. Applicability of manifolds is to whole object-domains as such not to their adumbrated contents considered separately. Such domains are therefore not comprised of individuals but of systematically-related contents produced by an adumbration. Thus, I conclude that technical evidence pertains to the intuitional content of the lifeworld utilized as a resource through an adumbration producing abstract moments of significations, nodal points in systemic structures.¹⁷ Whatever such individuals may be outside of such a rendering is left entirely outside the possibility of modern formalizing knowledge.¹⁸ It is this phenomenon that grounds the experience of the “retreat of Being” in modernity which prompts phenomenology to undertake its healing vocation.

Consequently, the circular relation that Hegel attempts to establish between ancient and modern knowledge is not valid since the full concretion as an individual cannot be recovered from the standpoint of systemic structures. It is this invalidity that prevents the phenomenological diagnosis and attempted healing of modernity from simply inscribing itself within the Hegelian-Marxist problematic of alienation. Hegel described this problematic in this way: “Hence the task nowadays consists not so much in purging the individual of an immediate, sensuous mode of apprehension, and making him into a substance, that is an object of thought and that think, but rather in just

the opposite, in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity [*als vielmehr in dem Entgegengesetzten, durch das Aufheben der festen bestimmten Gedanken ...*] so as to give actuality to the universal, and impart it to spiritual life.”¹⁹ Due to the nature of formal, symbol-generating abstraction as an “abstraction of abstraction,” not simply as an abstraction, ancient and modern knowledge are not “just the opposite” as Hegel asserts. It is this purported opposition that grounds the alienation-and-return circle.

The upshot of Klein’s revision of Husserl’s account of the crisis of European sciences is as follows: Husserl contrasted the everyday situational practical truths relative to practical projects that characterizes knowledge in the life-world with scientific truth. He claimed, in addition, that they have a certain relationship such that the grounding of scientific truths “leads back precisely to the situational truths, but in such a way that scientific method does not suffer thereby in respect to its own meaning, since it wants to use and must use precisely these truths.”²⁰ It is this “leading back” from scientific truths to the lifeworld which constituted the healing intention of Husserl’s phenomenology that can no longer be accepted after Klein’s clarification of the unprecedented character of symbol-generating abstraction discovered by Vieta. Between technical evidence and the intuition of individuals in the lifeworld lies a chasm due to the centrality of symbol-generating abstraction to modern knowledge.

It is this difference, or discontinuity, between technical manifolds and the immediate evidence of the lifeworld that I want to take up in the context of the application of formal systems to the domain of everyday human *praxis* whose understanding is attempted by the human sciences. Even though this was not a main concern of Klein's work, I want to suggest that his analysis of symbol-generating abstraction has a yet-unappreciated significance in this domain. I will begin from the one lecture, called "Modern Rationalism" and delivered in a class on 'Rationalism and Capitalism,' in which he addressed this question in a preliminary and inconclusive manner.

Klein begins by defining rationalization in standard sociological terms as "an entirely ordered world" in which "our life is modeled on certain patterns."²¹ He observes that a "jump" occurred in the 17th century "perhaps to freedom, perhaps to slavery," invoking again classical sociological debates, and links these issues to those of Husserl's *Crisis* and his own work on the origin and nature of modern scientific rationalism with the remark that "whatever explanation you may give for the development of the world since 1600 ... you can't deny that this development is *primarily dependent* upon a certain frame of mind, on a certain way of thinking."²² Klein continues by rejecting the rationalism-irrationalism dichotomy and tracing modern rationalism in both its empiricist and idealist versions back to Descartes. He links the Cartesian innovation to mathematical physics which he claims to be "the most

important part of our entire civilization and actual life” due to its influence on technics, our understanding of the world, and “our whole way of thinking and behavior.”²³ In all this he shows his allegiance to Husserl’s diagnosis of modernity except perhaps in the very large claim of the extent of this influence which is only implicit in Husserl. (In any case, neither Husserl nor Klein introduce any comparative considerations to establish that this is the most important determinant rather than simply a very important one.) Klein then comes to the main point of his own historical investigations—Descartes, Vieta and Stevins—and defines modern *mathesis universalis* through its characteristic of being a method of finding out all possible truth, or “methodical procedure, according to certain rules” such that the ancient border between applied and pure science is overcome to produce a science oriented to mastering nature.²⁴

The organization of our whole life by the rationalization of methods is thus attributed to a science which “is not only applicable to certain procedures, the result of which is technics, but is in itself technical.”²⁵ Klein then goes on to ask by what means modern science accomplishes this and gives in reply a short sketch of the difference between ancient and modern conceptuality based on his understanding of algebra as symbol-generating abstraction. He has no doubt that “these features of the *mathesis universalis*, which appear most forcefully in our Science of Nature dominate our entire manner of thinking, can, I trust, be traced in the social and economic fields in which we live.”²⁶ The modern

conceptuality of natural science is thus reflected in the methodical organization of the social world.

He concludes by stating that “we approach the world not directly but by means of concepts which are abstractions of abstractions and which at the same time *we interpret* as being in direct contact with the world”²⁷ and ends with a familiar peroration on the automatism of contemporary life whose “social and economic necessities ... are alien to ourselves and which we nevertheless accept as the true expression of ourselves. Our work, our pleasures, even our love and our hatred are dominated by these all-pervading forces which are beyond our control.”²⁸ Klein is thus quite willing to apply his understanding of modern mathematical abstraction to the thematic of external rationalization as understood in the sociological theory of modernity. What is not clear is whether he is appropriating the Hegelian-Marxist scheme of alienation-and-return that the phenomenological account of the retreat of Being in modernity, especially when given the deeper foundation of his own account of symbol-generating abstraction, has shown to be invalid. What other form of critique of modern reification is possible?

If we recall the upshot of Klein’s revision of Husserl, it is apparent that the institutionalization of ‘rational’ social ‘abstractions of abstractions’ cannot be founded with adequate evidence in the lifeworld. They are technologies which adumbrate ‘individuals’ in the lifeworld in terms generated by formal abstractions and render these adumbrations

as a 'system' in which the adumbrations function as nodes. Thus, social rationalization extends throughout the entire lifeworld by rendering individuals as nodes. The difference between individuals and nodes is the concrete evidence of the discontinuity, or chasm, between formal abstractions and intuition of individuals. Formal abstraction therefore does not encompass the concrete abstractions with which one directs everyday praxis. Social rationalization consists in the *disjunction* between lifeworld orientations and understandings and those of formal science. Thus, whenever practical understandings are rationalized they are distorted through the distinct adumbration required by the formal sign-system.²⁹

Social rationalizations, such as the medical system, for example, adumbrate individuals as 'clients,' who are not whole human individuals—all clients are identical insofar as they are clients; they form a class whose abstract identity can be filled in with an abstract determination of lower universality. Individuals in the lifeworld develop and orient themselves through understandings that function within everyday praxis. But when such praxis is thought rigorously under the conditions of modern conceptuality it loses contact with praxis and succumbs to social rationalization. The lifeworld is thus riven by a tension stemming from 'top-down' rationalizations and 'bottom-up' praxis.

It is this tension that gives rise to what Klein calls the “symbolic unreality” of “our whole social and economic system” known as capitalism whenever one tries to represent it in terms taken from, and relevant to the content of, everyday life.³⁰ It can then be seen that Klein’s understanding of the modern lifeworld justifies the statement by Hannah Arendt that the councils are the continuous spontaneous invention of modern revolution. They are the riposte, as it were, by the the whole individual, in all his or her relations, to the adumbrations performed by the institutions of modern capitalism. “No tradition, either revolutionary or pre-revolutionary, can be called to account for the regular emergence and re-emergence of the council system ever since the French Revolution.”³¹ This specifically modern freedom emerges as a critique of modern rationalization because “wherever knowing and doing have parted company, the space of freedom is lost.”³² Unlike Arendt, however, Klein’s analysis suggests that this experience is not confined to politics understood as opposed to social and economic claims³³ but is a continuing possibility in any form of human organization wherever lifeworld praxis threatens to become a source of spontaneous organization that could over-ride rationalization. There is thus a continuous and necessary tension in modernity between rationalizations dependent on formal universals and the material universalizations emergent from lifeworld praxis.

Understanding such emergent universalizations rooted in the concrete intuition of individuals requires that attention be directed toward the particular experiences from which reflection begins. Unlike formal abstraction, emergent universalizations are not nodes within a system but points of origination. They reckon with situations rather than apply procedures. Situated reflection depends on the lateral relations of whole individuals that are not systematizable.³⁴ Modern rationalization thus proceeds by adumbrating individuals into nodes within a systematic connection, whereas emergent universalizations resist such subsumption. My argument appropriating Klein's correction of Husserl therefore suggests that the healing role of phenomenology with regard to the crisis of the European sciences consists in the critique of technical manifolds and the provision of aid and comfort to the praxis of councils.

This argument is relevant to the unity of philosophy that Husserl declared in tandem with his investigations in *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. He asserted that "reason allows for no differentiation into 'theoretical,' 'practical,' 'aesthetic,' or whatever ... being human is teleological being and an ought-to-be, and ... this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego."³⁵ While divisions of this sort, which had a canonical stature in modern philosophy, are not justified within phenomenology, the present argument concludes with a different division of philosophy based upon whether one begins from the top-down implications of technical

manifolds or from the bottom-up implications of lifeworld involvements. The lack of continuity between these two termini suggests that it is not irrelevant from which end of the issue one begins. Perhaps one might call this a difference between civilizational and existential, or praxis, philosophy. When one begins from technical manifolds one takes on the Husserlian task in which the philosopher acts as a “functionary of mankind.”³⁶ However, one also is justified in beginning from lifeworld involvements which cannot be reconciled with the highest dimensions of modern reason and yet reasoning about them in their own terms. In short, a very un-Husserlian suspicion of reason should accompany us when we attempt to think through our own affairs—a suspicion that if we rationalize too much, enough to think of one’s own-ness (*Eigenlichkeit*) as merely a case of the highest form anything-whatever, that one will lose the lifeworld concretion that is essential to the task of philosophy itself.³⁷

Footnotes:

¹ Jacob Klein, *Greek Mathematics and the Origin of Algebra*, trans. Eva Brann (New York: Dover, 1968) p. 125.

² The advantage of the term ‘institution’ is that it can be used in two senses, both of which are relevant to the concept here. Something is ‘instituted’ in the sense of being brought into being and something is an ‘institution’ in the sense of a persistent organized structure within which intersubjective and material relations are organized. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) p. 73-4.

³ This would imply a correlative inquiry to be named ‘transcendental spatiality’ that was neither initiated nor pursued by Husserl.

⁴ This inquiry takes a particular form determined by its object and the historical event of crisis that Husserl called ‘dismantling,’ or ‘unbuilding,’ (*Abbau*) which is the origin of the terms ‘Destruktion’ and ‘deconstruction’ in Heidegger and Derrida. This term arose in connection with Husserl’s investigations into ‘Genetic Logic’ in about 1921 and surfaced afterward whenever it was an issue of genetic constitution. Ludwig Landgrebe, “Editor’s Foreword to the 1948 Edition” to Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) p. 5.

⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Crisis*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 22.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 46. Husserl uses various terms to describe the technical character of modern science. On this page he initially uses the term *Kunst* and its related forms to refer to ‘technique’ and then in his definition (and in the title for the sub-section) uses *Technik* and related forms. See Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954) p. 45-6. In the introduction to Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969) pp. 3, 16, while addressing the same issue, he uses the terms *Technik* and *Technologie*. See Edmund Husserl, *Formale und Transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. Paul Janssen, Husserliana XVII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974) pp. 7, 20. The relation between the terms deriving from art (*poiesis*, *Kunst*) versus those deriving from technique (*techne*, *Technik*) to describe this phenomenon obviously has a long history. I do not see a systematic distinction or usage in Husserl’s terms and thus usage of ‘technique’ to refer to the phenomenon appears justified. In the same spirit, Dorion Cairns, in his *Guide for Translating Husserl* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) suggests ‘technology’ as the English equivalent for both *Kunstlehre* and *Technik*.

⁸ *Crisis*, p. 44. In *Logic*, p. 80, Vieta is credited with the establishment of algebra which led to deductive technique and, through Leibniz, to *mathesis universalis*. While somewhat more complete, this account adds nothing essential to the reference in *Crisis*.

⁹ Jacob Klein, "Phenomenology and the History of Science," in *Lectures and Essays* (Annapolis: St. John's College Press, 1985) p. 83.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 81.

¹¹ *Greek Mathematics*, p. 123.

¹² Husserl, *Logic*, p. 93. Internal quotation marks excised.

¹³ *Greek Mathematics*, p. 185.

¹⁴ Burt Hopkins, "Crisis, History and Husserl's Phenomenological Project of De-sedimenting the Formalization of Meaning: Jacob Klein's Contribution" in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003, p. 98.

¹⁵ Ian Angus, *Technique and Enlightenment: Limits of Instrumental Reason* (Washington: Centre for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1984) p. 37.

¹⁶ The term adumbration (*Abschattung*) is a technical term used by Husserl to refer to the manner in which a perceived object is seen as a whole but always from a given side in an adumbration of the whole. See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) pp. 86ff.

¹⁷ Ian Angus, *Technique and Enlightenment*, p. 52-3.

¹⁸ The notion of a 'system' is, therefore, as Heidegger says, specifically and definitionally modern. Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Nature of Human Freedom*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985) p. 29ff.

¹⁹ G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) pp. 19-20; G.W.F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952) p. 30.

²⁰ *Crisis*, p. 132.

²¹ Jacob Klein, "Modern Rationalism," in *Lectures and Essays* (Annapolis: St. John's College Press, 1985) p. 54.

²² *Ibid*, p. 54. Emphasis added.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 57.

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 59, 60.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 60.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 63.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 63. Emphasis added.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 63-4.

²⁹ This implies that like Marx and unlike Weber the lifeworld contains resources for critique of rationalization but that the problem arises with respect to the 'translation' of one into the other. Also, the 'individuals' in question are not simply individuals but any 'person' (in Husserl's sense

including “higher-order persons”) or what we would now call any ‘social identity.’ See Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969) p. 132. Cairns translates *Personalitäten höherer Ordnung* slightly misleadingly as “higher-level personalities” insofar as, in ordinary English, it emphasizes the difference of one personality from another. “Higher-order persons” corresponds more directly to Husserl’s meaning of the ‘person-character’ of such social unities. It does follow, however, from their ‘person-character’ that such characters are diverse and thus analogous to ‘personalities.’

³⁰ Jacob Klein, “Modern Rationalism,” p. 64.

³¹ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1965) p. 265.

³² *Ibid*, p. 268.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 278.

³⁴ It is this phenomenon that led Merleau-Ponty to search for a “lateral universal” which refers to a way to universality through the self-other relation that has been brought into philosophy through the challenge presented by sociology and the human sciences more generally. “This provides a second way to the universal: no longer the overarching universal of a strictly objective method, but a sort of lateral universal which we acquire through ethnological experience and its incessant testing of the self through the other person and the other person through the self.” In opposition to the “overarching universal,” the lateral universal is charged with “constituting a more comprehensive experience which becomes in principle accessible to men of a different time and country.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “From Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss” in Richard C. McCleary (trans.) *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) p. 120. The materiality (in Husserl’s sense) of the universalization is thus mutually dependent on its laterality (in Merleau-Ponty’s sense).

³⁵ *Crisis*, p. 341. Walter Biemel placed this as the last section of the main text, thereby implying that it presented a sort of conclusion to the foregoing analyses. David Carr is more cautious in the English translation where it is included as an appendix. His reasons are given in the Translator’s Introduction, p. xx.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 17.

³⁷ The further aspect of this point concerns the final institution (*Endstiftung*) that Husserl saw as accompanying every original institution (*Urstiftung*). Such finality refers only to the claim of the institution to organize the lifeworld and not to the persisting influence of the institution itself. This is a point very close to the ‘hypothesis of closure’ in deconstruction where it is possible to continue to work within the closure given that such work simply repeats given alternatives and does not constitute a break with the horizon within such previous alternatives have been limited.